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EDITORIAL REPRINT

The Aim and Purpose of the Theosophical Movement

H. C. DUFFIN

Creative Evolution and the Fourth Dimension

K. R. R. SASTRY

Manu and Thiruvalluvar

B. B. PALIWAL

Tradition and the Dissociation of Sensibility: I

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Masti Venkatesa Iyengar's *Short Stories*; H. P. Blavatsky's *Collected Writings*, Vols. I & II; *Journeys in Belief*; *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*; *William Blake*; *The Language of Wisdom and Folly*

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Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL XXXIX NOVEMBER 1968 No. 11

The Aim and Purpose of the Theosophical Movement

[In this month falls the anniversary of the launching of the Theosophical Movement in November 1875. A great Orientalist and scholar of the day called it "the most serious movement of the age." Its aims and purposes are concerned, in the widest way, with the development of the human mind in a more spiritual direction. We reprint for the occasion passages which explain the aim and inspiration of the Theosophical Movement, from the volume *The Theosophical Movement: 1875–1950*, published by the Cunningham Press, Los Angeles. This should serve to make clear the nature of this movement, which, we consider, remains the most serious movement of the age.—ED.]

WHEREVER thought has struggled to be free, wherever spiritual ideas, as opposed to forms and dogmatism, have been promulgated, there is to be discerned that great surge of moral evolution which H. P. Blavatsky described and named as the Theosophical Movement. It may, therefore, be considered simply as the path of spiritual progress, individually and collectively, of human beings. The continuous effort of men to act upon their aspiration toward a higher and nobler life is always pressing against and bursting through the limitations of the established social order. Organized religion, invariably a bastion of the *status quo*, gives formal structure to the compromise between idealism and the forces of human timidity — the longing of men for external security. In this sense, churches, governments, parties, sects, are all "political" adaptations — expedient arrangements on behalf of the "practical" rather than the ideal. They all in time become irredeemably corrupt, and must change, as the times change, as human defects come out, and as the necessities of intellectual and moral evolution compel such alterations. ...

The nineteenth century was above all a period of conflict between the old and the new, a time of ferment in the intellectual and moral world, and

of growing self-consciousness in the field of social philosophy. Nineteenth-century science was the fecund parent of scores of new doctrines and theories about the nature of things. The first half of the century was a sort of Indian summer, in which both Europe and America gathered in the rich harvest of Revolutionary freedom secured by the struggles of the eighteenth century. Transcendentalist idealism brightened the Western world, concealing for a time the maturing forces of materialism in science and masking the decline of revolutionary ideals into mere shibboleths of reorganizing conservatism. During the middle years of the century, however, two new factors of disturbance emerged — Darwinism and Spiritualism. ...

... the Theosophical Movement, in the conception of its Founders, was inaugurated with a clear perspective of the historical forces that were recreating the mind and society of the Western world in the nineteenth century, and with foresight of the social and moral dilemmas that would confront all mankind during the present epoch. The Theosophical Society of 1875 opened a great channel for labours on behalf of the general welfare and enlightenment of the human race. It was not founded as a cult or sect to bring personal deliverance or special knowledge to the fortunate few who might accept its doctrines. The Founders of the Theosophical Movement had little interest in starting "Societies," or groups for "occult study," as such. Their concern was with the long-term view of human evolution, with the spiritual and moral needs of the race for generations and centuries to come.

If Theosophy does indeed offer knowledge of the laws of human evolution, then the course of the Theosophical Movement, its progress, as well as the character of the obstacles impeding its advance, provide the means of testing the validity of that teaching in practical experience. At this point, therefore, certain basic Theosophical conceptions of evolutionary law may be stated.

So far as humanity is concerned, Theosophy teaches a triple evolutionary scheme, in which, at the present time, the physical is subordinated to the processes of intellectual and spiritual, or moral, development. In short, Evolution is *soul* evolution, proceeding under moral law which is an essential part of the natural order. The ideal goal toward which mankind slowly moves is a great brotherhood of all human beings, in which, finally, will flower every evolutionary potentiality. Reaching this goal, however, is conditional upon deliberate human striving toward it, upon the achievement of knowledge of man's nature and destiny, and upon the factors of moral decision which make every human being a free agent, capable of choosing to become either a Christ or a Judas, either an altruist or a self-seeking egotist. For the race, as for the individual, Theos-

ophy preaches the doctrine of "salvation by works." Such "works," however, must be informed by knowledge of human needs; hence, mastery of Theosophy means study of the philosophical doctrines which it teaches, as well as their practical application in individual life and toward larger social ends.

If there is an underlying spiritual and intellectual evolution with visible effects in history, a study of the past should disclose that the formation of the Theosophical Society and the permeation of the mind of the race by Theosophical ideas were preceded and accomplished by numerous collateral efforts. In his *History of Civilization in England,* a work foremost among such influences, the great English historian, H. T. Buckle, sums up the lessons of the past in a statement which may serve equally as a prophecy of the future of Theosophy and the Theosophical Movement. In the first volume of this work, Buckle wrote:

> Owing to circumstances still unknown, there appear, from time to time, great thinkers, who, devoting their lives to a single purpose, are able to anticipate the progress of mankind, and to produce a religion or a philosophy, by which important effects are eventually brought about. But if we look into history, we shall clearly see that, although the origin of a new opinion may be thus due to a single man, the result which the new opinion produces will depend on the condition of the people among whom it is propagated. If either a religion or a philosophy is too much in advance of a nation, it can do no present service, but must bide its time, until the minds of men are ripe for its reception. ... Every science and every creed has had its martyrs; ... According to the ordinary course of affairs, a few generations pass away, and then there comes a period, when these very truths are looked upon as commonplace facts; and a little later, there comes another period, in which they are declared to be necessary, and even the dullest intellects wonder how they could ever have been denied.[1]

According to the Theosophical view of history, Buckle's "circumstances still unknown" are in fact due to what may be termed the *karmic* provision of spiritual and intellectual evolution. Under the great moral Law, called "Karma" by the Buddhists, and at transitional periods in the cyclic progress of humanity, wise teachers restore to mankind through both direct and indirect channels some of the knowledge once known in the past, but which in the lapse of time has become lost or obscured by the complexities of psychic and personal evolution. These teachers, sometimes termed "Elder Brothers," in the Theosophical literature, are themselves at the forefront of the stream of evolution to which we belong. As such,

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[1] *History of Civilization in England* by H. T. BUCKLE (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1867), I. 186

they have a natural function to perform, taking an active, although often undisclosed, part in human history. And while this aspect of the operation of cyclic law is frequently delayed, even obstructed, by the ignorance of human beings, each rise and fall of civilization is succeeded by a regeneration and further progression.

The scene of the nineteenth-century cycle of the Theosophical Movement included the United States, Europe, and India. In America, the rising energies of a new nation gave promise of great success for this movement of self-reform based upon a psychology of soul-knowledge. India, an ancient source of the Wisdom-Religion, was slowly awakening from the lethargy of centuries, getting ready for a cultural renaissance that would revive her former glory and give contemporary vigour to the Eastern heritage of spiritual philosophy. England, where Madame Blavatsky made her headquarters during the closing years of her mission, was a natural link between the ancient East and the youthful West, both politically and geographically, and served also as a vantage-point from which to affect the main continent of Europe.

The flow of Theosophic ideas from these centres entered the ferment of nineteenth-century thought, leavening its spirit, and challenging both the bigotry of inherited religion and the arrogant assurance of scientific materialism. The establishment of the Movement in the West followed close upon a cycle of sudden progress in material achievement by Western nations. Change was in the air. The practical consequences of the great developments in invention, scientific discovery, transportation, manufacture and communication were bringing the members of the human family closer together. Old ways of life were rapidly transformed. Traditions died. Customs were altered. Natural as well as cultural barriers to human fraternity were falling all about. ...

... H. P. Blavatsky maintained that the hour had come for bringing some unified explanation to the besetting problems of the modern world.

AFTER long study and experience, I have come to the conclusion that (1) all religions are true; (2) all religions have some error in them; (3) all religions are almost as dear to me as my own Hinduism, inasmuch as all human beings should be as dear to me as one's own close relatives. My own veneration for other faiths is the same as that for my own faith.

—GANDHIJI

V. V. BHATT

The Gandhian Conception of Social Order

[We print below the second and concluding portion of Shri V. V. Bhatt's well-documented study of Gandhiji's philosophy of social life. The first part appeared in our issue of October 1968.—ED.]

II

IT FOLLOWS THEN that the body exercising control over the individual must be such that it is in a position to take advantage of each significant experience of the individuals under its control. Whenever its control becomes arbitrary, in no way related to the common experiences of its members, they must be in a position to change it and replace it by one which represents the will of the people. It must be "a government ... by the consent of the people as ascertained by the largest number of the adult population."[15] Even such a representative government, however, should not have powers beyond those that are absolutely necessary.

> I look upon an increase in the power of the State with the greatest fear, because, although while apparently doing good by minimizing exploitation, it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress.[16]
>
> Hence the classical statement of Thoreau that, that government is best which governs the least.[17]

Moreover, it is necessary that the governmental unit exercising control over the individual must be fairly small. If it is too big, he is bound to feel, at some time or the other, that he is merely a cog in a big machine, over which he has no direct control owing to the inevitable growth of bureaucratization, rigidity, and inflexibility, which accompany big organizations. When that happens, the relationship between the individual and the organization will no longer remain personal, and control will have to be exercised by the use of force. Changes thus will be delayed and individual liberty will not be attained in practice. From this it follows that the unit of social control must be so small that the individual must feel he has some voice in the moulding and shaping of the affairs which intimately concern him. It must also be small in order that the control over the individual be made effective by moral persuasion rather than by means of force.

Decentralization of political power thus is a *sine qua non* for the real-

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[15] *Young India*, 29 January 1925

[16] *The Modern Review*, October 1935

[17] *Young India*, 2 July 1931

ization of individual liberty. "Centralization as a system is inconsistent with a non-violent structure of society."[18] "Centralization cannot be sustained and defended without adequate force."[19] Hence Gandhi's insistence on village republics as the basic primary units and a federal structure of the State.

However, even with these village republics, no individual can be really free unless he is assured of the primary necessities of life. That means that

> [the individual] should be able to get sufficient work to enable him to make the two ends meet. And this ideal can be universally realized only if the means of production of the elementary necessities of life remain in the control of the masses. These should be freely available to all as God's air and water are or ought to be; they should not be made a vehicle of traffic for the exploitation of others. Their monopolization by any country, nation or group of persons would be unjust.[20]

Each family, and if that is not possible each village, thus should be self-supporting as far as its vital needs are concerned.

More than this, there should be economic equality.

> Economic equality is the master key to non-violent independence. ... A non-violent system of government is clearly an impossibility so long as the wide gulf between the rich and the hungry millions persists.[21]

His idea of economic equality is intimately related to his doctrine of trusteeship.

> My idea of society is that while we are born equal, meaning that we have a right to equal opportunity, all have not the same capacity. It is in the nature of things impossible. For instance, all cannot have the same height, or colour, or degree of intelligence, etc.; therefore in the nature of things, some will have ability to earn more, and others less. People with talents will have more, and they will utilize their talents for this purpose. If they utilize their talents kindly, they will be performing the work of the State. Such people exist as trustees, on no other terms. I would allow a man of intellect to earn more. I would not cramp his talent. But the bulk of his greater earnings must be used for the good of the State, just as the income of all earning sons of the father go to the common family fund. They would have these earnings only as trustees.[22]

If, however, in spite of the utmost effort, the rich do not become the guardians of the poor in the true sense of the term, what is to be done?

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[18] *Harijan*, 18 January 1942
[19] *Ibid.*, 30 December 1939
[20] *Young India*, 15 November 1928
[21] *Constructive Programme : Its Meaning and Place*, p. 18
[22] *Young India*, 26 November 1931

> In trying to find out the solution of this riddle, I have lighted on non-violence, non-co-operation, and civil disobedience, as the right and infallible means. The rich cannot accumulate wealth without the co-operation of the poor in society.[23]

In this process, "if this truth was imbibed by the people generally, it would become legalized and trusteeship would become a legalized institution."[24]

Moreover, apart from legalizing the institution of trusteeship, economic equality could also be attained in practice by means of State taxation. Gandhi is in favour of steeply progressive income-tax and death duties.[25] According to him, "A trustee has no heir but the public."[26]

Further, in the non-violent society of Gandhi's conception, there would not be much scope for economic inequality to arise. Means of production of the elementary necessities of life would be owned by the masses and as far as public utilities, heavy industries, and the industries manufacturing capital goods necessary for producing the primary necessities of life are concerned, they would be owned or controlled by the State. These State-owned or State-controlled factories would "be working under the most attractive and ideal conditions, not for profit, but for the benefit of humanity, love taking the place of greed as the motive."[27]

Gandhi is not against all types of machinery. He would welcome "machinery for the service of the poorest in their own cottages"[28] He is also not against complicated machinery necessary for certain public utilities, heavy industries, and industries supplying capital goods to small-scale industries manufacturing the primary necessities of life.[29] Machinery should be used as an instrument not of greed but of service.[30] In all these matters, "the supreme consideration is man."[31]

> The type of mechanization which might lead to regimentation and the loss of spontaneity must be avoided as far as possible. ... If it is a hindrance to the highest flights of the soul, it has to be rejected.[32]
>
> What I object to is the craze for machinery, not machinery as such. The craze is for what they call labour-saving machinery. ... I want to save time and labour, not for a fraction of mankind, but for all; I want the concentration of wealth, not in the hands of a few, but in the hands of all. Today machinery merely helps a few to ride on the back of millions. The impetus behind it all is not the philanthropy to save labour,

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[23] *Harijan*, 25 August 1940
[24] *Ibid.*, 23 February 1947
[25] *Ibid.*, 31 July 1937
[26] *Ibid.*, 13 April 1938
[27] *Young India*, 11 November 1924
[28] *Ibid.*, 17 March 1927
[29] *Ibid.*, 13 November 1924
[30] *Harijan*, 29 August 1936
[31] *Young India*, 13 November 1924
[32] *Ibid.*, 20 November 1924

but greed. It is against this constitution of things that I am fighting with all my might.[33]

In such a social order, then, there can be no room for exploitation either of one individual by the other or of one social group by another. The motivating spirit behind the activities of individuals as well as social groups would be the good of mankind, and since this common good can never be realized by violence, there could be no wars either between classes or between States. There could be no place for "narrowness, selfishness or exclusiveness" in Gandhi's society. Even his nationalism is not exclusive.

My patriotism is not an exclusive thing. It is all-embracing and I should reject that patriotism which sought to mount upon the distress or the exploitation of other nationalities. The conception of my patriotism is nothing if it is not always, in every case without exception, consistent with the broadest good of humanity at large.[34]

Gandhi is not an isolationist either. "Isolated independence is not the goal of the world-states. It is voluntary interdependence."[35]

The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent states warring one against another, but a federation of friendly interdependent states. The consummation of that event may be far off. I want to make no grand claim for our country. But I see nothing grand or impossible about our expressing our readiness for universal interdependence rather than independence. ... I desire the ability to be totally independent without asserting the independence.[36]

How then to establish such a social order?

But a new social order cannot be forced; that would be a remedy worse than the disease. I am an impatient reformer. I am all for thoroughgoing radical social ordering; but it must be an organic growth, not a violent superimposition.[37]

Non-violent resistance to the present social order by means of love and self-suffering, self-sacrifice, and self-immolation is the only effective way of bringing about this change; for, it converts men and in the process destroys the evil.

Those who seek to destroy men rather than manners adopt the latter and become worse than those whom they destroy under the mistaken belief that the manners will die with the man.[38]

For it is my firm conviction that nothing enduring can be built on violence.[39]

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[33] *Ibid.*, 13 November 1924
[34] *Ibid.*, 4 April 1929
[35] *Ibid.*, 26 December 1924
[36] *Ibid.*, 21 March 1929
[37] *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, 3 August 1934
[38] *Young India*, 17 March 1927
[39] *Ibid.*, 15 November 1928

He suggests the same matchless weapon of *Satyāgraha* for bringing about world peace.

> Peace will never come until the Great Powers courageously decide to disarm themselves. ... I have an implicit faith, a faith that today burns brighter than ever, after half a century's experience of unbroken practice of non-violence — that mankind can only be saved through non-violence.[40]
>
> It would be found that before general disarmament in Europe commences, as it must some day, unless Europe is to commit suicide, some nation will have to dare to disarm herself and take large risks.[41]
>
> If even one nation were unconditionally to perform the supreme act of renunciation, many of us would see in our lifetime visible peace established on earth.[42]

V. V. BHATT

AWAY, then, with the fictions and workings of discursive reason, either for or against Christianity! They are only the wanton spirit of the mind, whilst ignorant of God and insensible of its own nature and condition. Death and life are the only things in question; life is God living and working in the soul; death is the soul living and working according to the sense and reason of bestial flesh and blood. Both this life and this death are of their own growth, growing from their own seed within us, not as busy reason talks and directs, but as the heart turns either to the one or to the other.

—WILLIAM LAW

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[40] *Ibid.*, 8 September 1925

[41] *Ibid.*, 19 November 1925

[42] *Harijan*, 24 December 1938

H. C. DUFFIN

Creative Evolution and the Fourth Dimension.

[Mr. H. C. Duffin is an old friend and a distinguished literary critic among whose books are *Amphibian*, a literary study of Robert Browning, and *Thomas Hardy*, which has been re-issued in India for the special use of Universities. In this interesting essay, he considers the implications of the fourth dimension. He points out logically that a fourth dimension of reality implies the evolution of human beings with a four-dimensional mode of perception. He relates these ideas to the philosophical idea of the different dimension in which spiritual consciousness exists. Readers should find his lucid exposition of great interest.

To those who find the theme interesting, there will be food for thought in the appended quotations from Madame H. P. Blavatsky's *The Secret Doctrine* on some of the topics touched upon in the essay.—ED.]

LET US SUPPOSE that we feel we understand that life has crept slowly and painfully but triumphantly up out of the abyss of unconscious existence to the light, or the half-light, of man, the self-conscious mind. But we feel also that man is not the end of the process. There must be a next stage, and it may be going to happen within some period that can be imaginatively conceived.

What is the new mutation that shall bring about the leap over to a new species, genus, or order? The ability to grow, develop, and reproduce marked the change from inorganic to plant life; the power of voluntary movement the change from plant to animal; consciousness perhaps the change from the lowest form of animal life to the higher forms; and self-consciousness the transformation into man. What is to be the new factor, and into what kind of being will it change *Homo sapiens*? It is possible that the new factor will be a mastery of time.

Theories about time have engaged many minds and imaginations — those for instance of Bergson, Dunne, Priestley, Wells, Shaw, Whitehead, Ouspensky — during the past fifty years, and it seems likely that this general interest has some significance. M. Louis Cazamian indeed suggests that the contemporary interest in time is a morbid interest, characteristic of an aging civilization, one that is living too fast and is preoccupied with the thought of death. This view seems a little perverse: I venture to take a more hopeful one.

Some explanation certainly seems to be required for the fact that man's command of time is immeasurably behind his control of space. While our mastery of space increases almost daily, we have not yet learnt the smallest rudiments of movement in time: in this respect Einstein and Edding-

ton stand precisely where *Pithecanthropus* stood. The explanation possibly is that the power to move in space has had, from the beginning of the animal stage, great survival value, while the need for the ability to move in time has not till now been felt. It might seem that the faculty of space movement has now contributed all it had to give, and that for further progress a new faculty, that of movement in time, will have to be developed.

Man moves freely in space, he can measure and manipulate space; so he knows space in three dimensions. Time we know only as it flows, or seems to flow, past us, as a tree growing in a stream might be aware of constant change at its fixed point of perception, but would have no idea of the nature of the stream itself. To know time only in moments is not to know it all, even though we have an advantage over the tree in our possession of memory and imagination: we perceive events before they happen and remember them as they recede into the past. It is by the use of imagination that man has arrived at the notion that time may be a fourth dimension, not of space but of reality.

A century or so ago Edwin Arber, in a fascinating little book called *Flatland,* showed that a two-dimensional being, existing in a plane surface, would perceive a three-dimensional object which moved through its plane as a series of two-dimensional cross-sections; in the same way, the process of change which we call time, the apparently progressive occurrence of events, may be our three-dimensional mode of apprehending a four-dimensional reality — in a series of three-dimensional cross-sections. The two-dimensional being would have no understanding of the nature of the three-dimensional world until it had learnt to move in the third dimension; similarly we shall be aware of the nature of reality only when we have acquired the power to move in the fourth dimension, time. We speak of the "fourth" dimension because we shall doubtless enter upon the new form of experience by single steps, but it appears likely that time, like space, has three dimensions, and that what we think of as the fourth dimension is the first of these three, which may be found brilliantly analysed by Ouspensky in *A New Model of the Universe.* All three dimensions have to be mastered before we can be as free of time as we are of space, and if by eternal life is meant that the mind, freed from its dependence on an imperfectly apprehended single dimension of time, will be able to move about in time, going back over life, making any chosen moment last as long as may be wished, exploring the unactualized possibilities of these and other chosen moments and the consequences of these new possibilities, and doing this not only for the individual life but for the whole of history, past and to come — this at least gives to the prospect a new and ample interest.

It has already been suggested that in memory and imagination we

possess feeble forerunners of the power to move along the first dimension of time, and other signs of such rudimentary faculty exist in dreams and in poetry. Much of the poet's experience takes place on planes of reality far removed from that on which he lives his normal life. Think of the love poems of Emily Brontë or of other poets whose lives were almost equally blameless. The situations that evoked their passionate utterances were imaginary, which does not mean unreal but taking place "out of time," or more strictly on some other plane of time. Consider again the mystic's technique of emptying his consciousness, first of external awareness, and then of thought: this may be a more deliberate method of achieving release from the three-dimensional focus of attention. The mystic feels that he attains, by this means, a grasp of an otherwise inaccessible truth: he calls it entering the presence of God, but it may be that what happens is that he finds himself in touch with multi-dimensional reality (which is perhaps one stage short of God). Telepathic communication probably operates "outside time." And there are moments that everyone knows when life is lived with such intensity that we feel "here at last is reality": the duration of such moments can hardly be measured in time, certainly not in clock-time; and this suggests what the new experience of time may be. Blake was aware of this, and spoke of holding "infinity in the palm of your hand and eternity in an hour."

It might be worth while to set a group of the best brains in the world — metaphysicians, scientists, mathematicians, psychologists, philosophers, poets, and mystics would all have to be included — the problem of devising the necessary technique, though it is to be feared that any such gathering of merely human savants would be wasting time — the very subject of their researches! Before the plant could acquire the power of voluntary movement in space it had to *become* a new species, and it would seem, by analogy, that before we can learn to move, like Wells's time-traveller, even back and forward in our own line of time we must wait for the long process of evolution to take place that shall transform us from human animals into the next species. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the advance to the new stage may be a quicker and more considered process than the change from vegetable to animal, which is estimated to have occupied at least 300,000,000 years. Not only have some 200,000,000 years of the animal phase of evolution already elapsed, but during the later stages of that phase the animal has developed a powerful and complex brain, and with it self-consciousness and imagination. In other words, the change to come can be foreseen, its problems studied, and their solution perhaps hastened. When the first specks of moving animal life appeared they were unaware that their ability to move had put them into command of a whole new world of experience. When the cor-

responding change happens to us we shall be waiting for it, shall know what has happened, and shall be able to enter deliberately upon the new multi-dimensional life, so much nearer reality than our illusory condition permits. No mere extension of our present faculties will enable us to move one inch or one second in time, but the evolutionary change required might be brought about by a quickening into consciousness of the evolutionary urge.

We now come to the question: what is to be the new order of being that will emerge through man's acquisition of the power to move in time, or what kind of being can we imagine that would be able to move in time? Even Wells did not believe (though his brilliant tale induces in the reader a willing suspension of disbelief) that by sitting on a machine made of nickel, ivory, and rock-crystal and pulling a lever a nineteenth-century man could travel into the future and return to tell his story. Olaf Stapledon, in that amazing book, *Last and First Men,* produced, by the normal workings of evolutionary laws, appropriately stimulated and allowed to operate over billions of years, a number of new species which make the Wellsian prophecies look childish. But while some of these were fascinating and others horrifying, all were straightforward developments of man as we know him; and, although Stapledon's Fifth Men discovered the trick of exploring the past, I do not myself believe that any variety of man as we know him, even with the most enormous brain and eyes on top of his head, will ever be able to move in time. Because to move in time means to know four-dimensional reality, and to know four-dimensional reality man must cease to be a three-dimensional creature. Four-dimensional reality can be nothing but a world beyond matter, the world of spirit, and the only being we can imagine moving in time is a spiritual being. When man has prepared himself, by passionate desire and prolonged search, for the appearance of the new mutation, it will suddenly begin to operate, and *Homo sapiens* will become *Homo spiritualis.* Then let entropy have its way, and the universe run down when it will!

However, man, the human spirit, is not all, nor is *Homo spiritualis* the end of creative evolution. The Shaw-Bergson theory indeed denies teleology. But the world is ultimately a spiritual world, and creative evolution must have a metaphysical end, and the end is God. In the beginning was the Word, the *Logos*: the Conception, the Purpose, the Will. In the beginning the *Logos* created heaven and earth, the universe of matter, the space-time continuum. The Universal Spirit, four-dimensional, created the three-dimensional structure. The wherefore is dark: it looks like a step down. Perhaps matter, like evil, is a half-way house between nothing and reality. Certainly the choice of this way made the great adventure — life is the adventure of spirit in the world of matter — tremendously exciting

for man. But the end, the infinitely distant aim, the vision that was the motive of the first creation and has been the inspiration and creative force of evolution, is the perfection of God. God, who created our imperfect world through the process of evolution, is not perfect, but the whole evolving process moves forward to his perfection. Or Whitehead's word, "realization," may be preferred. There is, he says, a process inherent in God's nature whereby his infinity is acquiring realization. At this stage in the process man, having attained to mind, imagination, self-consciousness, a mystic faculty, and some glimmering of a time-sense, can essay to help forward the mighty project.

All this may appear to be but old wine in a new bottle, man and matter on the one hand, called three-dimensional, God and the soul on the other, supposed existing in a four-dimensional world. It may well be so; but even eternal truths need restatement from time to time, and if the new terms are in tune with the age truth may regain its lost flavour. Today we tend to think in terms of physics and mathematics, and I find it easier to think of a four-dimensional being passing through a three-dimensional world than to think of a spirit entering a human body at birth and leaving it at death. The theory (if it is worth calling that) has the advantage of suggesting that life is not a falsification of reality but a true aspect of it. A circle is a true aspect of a sphere. The shadows in Plato's cave gave a genuine if incomplete picture of the men and objects that cast them. Perhaps the world of appearance bears the same relation to the world of reality as the words of a poem bear to the poem conceived by the poet.

When I propounded this parallel to Walter de la Mare he retorted that a poem has no existence until it gets into words. This rather disturbed me, implying as it does that the world of appearance is all there is. Which is not entirely out of the question.

H. C. DUFFIN

Time : Spirit-Matter : Sense Limitations

(from H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Secret Doctrine*)

Time is only an illusion produced by the succession of our states of consciousness as we travel through eternal duration, and it does not exist where no consciousness exists in which the illusion can be produced; but "lies asleep." The present is only a mathematical line which divides that part of eternal duration which we call the future, from that part which we call the past. Nothing on earth has real duration, for nothing remains without change — or the same — for the billionth part of a second; and the sensation we have of the actuality of the division of "time" known

as the present, comes from the blurring of that momentary glimpse, or succession of glimpses, of things that our senses give us, as those things pass from the region of ideals which we call the future, to the region of memories that we name the past. In the same way we experience a sensation of duration in the case of an instantaneous electric spark, by reason of the blurred and continuing impression on the retina. The real person or thing does not consist solely of what is seen at any particular moment, but is composed of the sum of all its various and changing conditions from its appearance in the material form to its disappearance from the earth. It is these "sum-totals" that exist from eternity in the "future," and pass by degrees through matter, to exist for eternity in the "past." No-one could say that a bar of metal dropped into the sea came into existence as it left the air, and ceased to exist as it entered the water, and that the bar itself consisted only of that cross-section thereof which at any given moment coincided with the mathematical plane that separates, and, at the same time, joins, the atmosphere and the ocean. Even so of persons and things, which, dropping out of the to-be into the has-been, out of the future into the past — present momentarily to our senses a cross-section, as it were, of their total selves, as they pass through time and space (as matter) on their way from one eternity to another: and these two constitute that "duration" in which alone anything has true existence, were our senses but able to cognize it there.

—Vol. 1, p. 37

... the daring explorer, who would probe the inmost secrets of Nature, must transcend the narrow limitations of sense, and transfer his consciousness into the region of noumena and the sphere of primal causes. To effect this, he must develop faculties which are absolutely dormant — save in a few rare and exceptional cases — in the constitution of the off-shoots of our present Fifth Root-race in Europe and America. He can in no other conceivable manner collect the facts on which to base his speculations.

—Vol. 1, pp. 477-8

... the characteristics of matter must clearly bear a direct relation to the senses of man. Matter has extension, colour, motion (molecular motion), taste and smell, corresponding to the existing senses of man, and by the time that it fully develops the next characteristic —-let us call it for the moment PERMEABILITY — this will correspond to the next sense of man — let us call it "NORMAL CLAIRVOYANCE": thus, when some bold thinkers have been thirsting for a fourth dimension to explain the passage of matter through matter, and the production of knots upon an endless cord, what they were really in want of, was a *sixth characteristic of matter.* The three dimensions belong really but to one attribute or characteristic of matter — extension; and popular common sense justly rebels against the idea that under any condition of

things there can be more than three of such dimensions as length, breadth, and thickness. These terms, and the term "dimension" itself, all belong to one plane of thought, to one stage of evolution, to one characteristic of matter. So long as there are foot-rules within the resources of Kosmos, to apply to matter, so long will they be able to measure it three ways and no more; and from the time the idea of measurement first occupied a place in the human understanding, it has been possible to apply measurement in three directions and no more. But these considerations do not militate in any way against the certainty that in the progress of time — as the faculties of humanity are multiplied — so will the characteristics of matter be multiplied also.

—Vol. I, pp. 251-2

He (the Occultist) maintains that Spirit and Matter are two FACETS of the unknowable UNITY, their apparently contrasted aspects depending (*a*) on the various degrees of differentiation of the latter, and (*b*) on the grades of consciousness attained by man himself.

—Vol. I, p. 543

There can be no manifestation of Consciousness, semi-consciousness, or even "unconscious purposiveness," except through the vehicle of matter; that is to say, on this our plane, wherein human consciousness *in its normal state* cannot soar beyond what is known as transcendental metaphysics, it is only through some molecular aggregation or fabric that Spirit wells up in a stream of individual or sub-conscious subjectivity. And as Matter existing apart from perception is a mere abstraction, both of these aspects of the ABSOLUTE — Cosmic Substance and Cosmic Ideation — are mutually inter-dependent. ... The pure object apart from consciousness is unknown to us, while living on the plane of our three-dimensional World; as we know only the mental states it excites in the perceiving Ego. And, so long as the contrast of Subject and Object endures — to wit, as long as we enjoy our five senses and no more, and do not know how to divorce our all-perceiving *Ego* (the Higher Self) from the thraldom of these senses — so long will it be impossible for the *personal* Ego to break through the barrier which separates it from a knowledge of *things in themselves* (*or Substance*). That Ego, progressing in an arc of ascending subjectivity, must exhaust the experience of every plane. But not until the Unit is merged in the ALL, whether on this or any other plane, and Subject and Object alike vanish in the absolute negation of the Nirvanic State (negation, again, only *from our plane*), is scaled that peak of Omniscience — the Knowledge of things-in-themselves; and the solution of the yet more awful riddle approached, before which even the highest Dhyan Chohan must bow in silence and ignorance — the unspeakable mystery of that which is called by the Vedantins, the PARABRAHMAM.

—Vol. I, pp. 328–30

K. R. R. SASTRY

Manu and Thiruvalluvar

[Shri K. R. R. Sastry is an old friend who appears in our pages after a long interval. In this article he brings out parallelisms between the teachings of Manu, the lawgiver, and those of Thiruvalluvar in the sacred *Kural,* which is a classic of Tamil literature as well as of Hindu piety. Readers will find the many quotations from the two great teachers of particular value.—ED.]

TAMIL is one of the oldest languages in the world and the sacred *Kural* of Sage Thiruvalluvar is a priceless string of 1,330 couplets. The date of Thiruvalluvar can be said to be prior to the second century A.D., though S. Vaiyapuri Pillai would take him to the sixth century A.D.

Translations of the *Kural* have been made into Latin (Father C. J. Beschi), French, German, English, Russian, Spanish, and Chinese. As Dr. G. U. Pope (1886) has sung of Thiruvalluvar:

> While lands far off have heard with strange surprise,
> Faint echoes of thy song — thro' all the earth
> Men hail thee, brother seer of spotless soul.

The work is divided into three main parts, termed in Sanskrit, *Dharma, Artha,* and *Kāma* or in the Tamil equivalents, *Aram, Porul,* and *Inbam* respectively.

It can be established that in the similarity of the seven elements of the kingdom — the King, the ministry, the country, defence, wealth, the army, and alliances — the author of the *Kural* was acquainted with the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya and the other Hindu books on politics such as Kamandaka's *Nītiśāstra.*

Besides utilizing the grand ethical themes found in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata,* Thiruvalluvar has delved deep also into *Manusmṛti* and other sacred lore.

Thiruvalluvar's approach to moral doctrine is, in the words of C. Rajagopalachari, "marked by a very thorough knowledge of human psychology and a desire to help imperfect men with practical hints in the struggle against evil."

The first book contains thirty-eight chapters with ten *kurals* in each. This book deals with the duties of man as a householder and as an ascetic.

Couplet 18 in Chapter 2 says:

> Worship and festival will fail the gods
> Should Heaven's rain dry up for men.
>
> (Trs. H. A. POPLEY)

This will remind one of verses 11, 12, and 14 in the third chapter of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

Couplet 31 in Chapter 4 runs thus:

> Righteousness leadeth unto Heaven and it bringeth wealth also; then what is there that is more profitable than Righteousness?
>
> (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

This will remind one of *śreyas* and *preyas* in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (I.2-2). It will also take one to *Manu* (XII.88).

Parimelazhagar, the distinguished commentator on couplet 38 in Chapter 4, refers to the "five *kleśas*," *Avidyā, Ahaṅkāra, Moha, Kāma,* and *Krodha*.

Couplet 41 iterating that the householder is the mainstay of all who follow the three other paths of life echoes the sentiment in *Manu* (III.78).

Couplet 43 in the Chapter runs:

> *Pitṛs*, gods, kin, one's guest and self
> To serve these is duty chief. (Trs. H. A. POPLEY)

As Dr. Pope has stated, this is an exact translation of *Manu* (III.72).

Here is the 57th couplet:

> Of what avail is close confinement? It is her own continence that is the best guardian of a woman's virtue. (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

This is a close translation as it were of *Manu* (IX.12).

Couplet 58 extolling the wife serving her husband echoes the identical passage in *Manu* (V.155).

Couplet 86 has the following:

> He 'll be a welcome guest to Gods on high
> Who speeds the parting guest
> And coming guest awaits. (Trs. H. A. POPLEY)

This sentiment is found in *Manu* (III.106).

Again, Couplet 87 says:

> There is no measure for the fruit of kindliness
> The guest's own worth — that is its measure true.
>
> (Trs. H. A. POPLEY)

This is exactly the spirit behind *Manu* (VII.86).

Couplet 322 in Chapter 33 runs thus:

> To divide one's bread with the needy and to abstain from killing: these are the greatest of all the commandments of all the prophets.
>
> (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

Couplet 349 in Chapter 35 runs:

> Deliverance comes only with the abandonment of attachments. Else the fleeting world must be one's home again. (Trs. RAJAJI)

An echo of this is to be found in *Manu* (XII.90).

Couplet 388 in the second part reads:

> Behold the prince who administers impartial justice and protecteth his subjects: he will be looked upon as a god among men.

The identical spirit is to be found in *Manu* (VII.4, 5), where the King is described as a part of Indra, wind, Sun God and Varuṇa, Moon and Kubera. The whole of Chapter 38 is reminiscent of *Manu* (VII).

Couplet 396 where knowledge is compared to a sandspring, has a parallel in *Manu* (II.218).

In Chapter 51 testing of men for confidence is mentioned. Couplet 501 has this:

> Before entrusting a man with power, test his loyalty by putting him through trials in respect of his attachment to religion, wealth, pleasure and life. (Trs. RAJAJI)

These tests are to be found in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (Part I, Chapter 10). All other stanzas in Chapter 51 are closely reminiscent of Chapter 4 of *Arthaśāstra.*

Couplet 502 reads thus:

> Birth in a good family, freedom from defects, moral and intellectual, and a sensitiveness to public censure — these are the necessary qualifications for being chosen to high office.

Parimelazhagar in his commentary states that this follows *Śukranīti.*

> Behold the man that is able to develop the resources of the kingdom and to cure the ills that may befall it: set him to manage thy affairs. (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

Parimelazhagar refers to the modes of developing the resources, which called to his memory *Śukranīti* (I.156).

Couplet 543 reads:

> The sceptre of the prince is the mainstay of the science of the Brahmans ["teachers" — Rajaji] and of righteousness also. (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

Any commentator on this has to refer to the Vedas and the Dharmaśāstras as the "Science of the Brahmans" (or "teachers"). Parimelazhagar remarks that though Veda and Dharma are beginningless, "the rod of the King has to be behind them."

Couplet 581 has:

> The spy service and authoritative books on statecraft should be deemed as the two eyes of the King. (Trs. RAJAJI)

Parithiar in his commentary refers specifically to "*Manu-nool*" (*Manu-smṛti*) and spies as the "two watchful eyes."

One can refer with profit to *Kamandaka* (XII.30) and the *Mahābhārata* (*Śānti Parva,* LXXXIII).

Couplet 586 reads:

> The garb of *sanyasins* and of religious orders were favourite disguises to obtain admission into places not easily accessible.

Though this whole chapter closely follows the lines of the *Arthaśāstra,* it is relevant to recall that Kauṭilya commends the use of "ascetics, snake-charmers and merchants" in disguise. Whatever is done therein, they should not let out secrets (*cf., Kamandaka,* XII.29, and *Arthaśāstra,* II.13).

Couplet 631 in Chapter 64 says:

> A minister should be resolute in action, have the welfare of the people at heart, possess learning and discrimination and be ever active.
>
> (Trs. RAJAJI)

Thiruvalluvar uses the term "*Amaichhar*" which is the Sanskrit word "*Amātya.*"

Here is a couplet which excels the text of Yājñavalkya (II.175) that "aged parents, a chaste wife, and an infant son should be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds." This couplet runs thus:

> Do not do that which good men would condemn even if it means your helplessly looking on while your mother starves.

Parimelazhagar refers to this striking deviation with wholesome praise.

Couplet 662 has the following:

> One — do not undertake action that cannot be successful; the other — if anything goes wrong, in the course of an undertaking, do not be perturbed; but face difficulties boldly. (Trs. RAJAJI)

In his commentary, Parimelazhagar mentions that Thiruvalluvar was indebted to the propounders of *Daṇḍa-Nīti* — "Vyazham" (Bṛhaspati) and "Velli" (Śukrācārya).

Couplet 742 runs:

> A good fortress should have a moat with water during all seasons, an esplanade, with hills and dense forests around. (Trs. RAJAJI)

This is exactly as found in *Śukranīti.*

Again here is Couplet 748:

> That is the veritable fortress which enableth the garrison to defeat the besiegers even when they exert their utmost against it.
>
> (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

This is traceable to *Śukranīti* (I.238).

Couplet 755 has:

> Wealth that can be got by discarding compassion (on the part of the acquirer) and without love (on the part of those who part with it) is not to be cared for, but should be spurned.

Parimelazhagar comments on this *kural* that the tax justly collected would be one-sixth of the income or produce. This exactly corresponds to the prescription of *Manu* (VII.131-132; VIII.35-36).

Couplet 767 reads:

> That which deserveth the name of army always goeth for the enemy; for it is confident of overcoming him wherever he offers battle.

Parimelazhagar in his commentary states: "To describe a *vyūha* with the names and number would take too long. For details the Sanskrit works should be consulted."

Couplet 1075 runs:

> Fear is the only motive force of degenerates; if there is any other at all, it is appetite, and it availeth just a little. (Trs. V. V. S. AIYER)

Thiruvalluvar's use of the Sanskrit term *ācāra* recalls *Manu* (VII.22).

That Sage Thiruvalluvar fully utilized prior Sanskrit works on the science of polity such as *Manusmṛti, Arthaśāstra,* and the epics to present his unique work of unparalleled terse couplets is a great tribute to the minister turned ascetic.

One cannot improve on the tribute of Dr. G. U. Pope in *The Sacred Kural* (p. xv). He applies to the great classic the words used by Archbishop Trench in referring to St. Augustine:

> He abounds in short and memorable, and if I might so call them, epigrammatic sayings, concentrating with a forceful brevity the whole truth which he desires to impart into some single phrase, forging it into a polished shaft, at once pointed to pierce and barbed that it shall not lightly drop from the mind and memory.

The appreciation by M. Ariel, the illustrious French scholar in Tamil, is the keynote of universalism. That Thiruvalluvar should remind every one of his own religion is due to the fact that the "author addresses himself without regard to castes, peoples, or beliefs to the whole community of mankind." He is "equally perfect in thought, in language, and in poetry, in the austere metaphysical contemplation of the great mysteries of the Divine nature, as in the easy and graceful analysis of the tenderest emotions of the heart."

K. R. R. SASTRY

B. B. PALIWAL

Tradition and Dissociation of Sensibility

[This is the first appearance of Shri B. B. Paliwal, M.A., in our pages. He has taught English literature in various colleges in Rajasthan and Panjab. At present he is a member of the Department of English, University of Udaipur, and is carrying out research on "The Poetic Revolution of the Nineteen-twenties."

In this long essay Shri Paliwal explores the validity of the view made well known by T. S. Eliot that literature began to suffer from dissociation between sensibility and the intellect proper at a particular point of time in the history of English culture. Other writers have suggested different dates for the beginning of this process of dissociation; still others do not feel that the problem is one simply of the history of culture. In any case, the creative value of integration between intellect and sensibility is undoubted.

We print below the first part of Shri Paliwal's study. The second will appear in the next issue.—ED.]

I

TRADITION can be interpreted in two ways: the tradition of English poetry coming from Chaucer through Ben Jonson, Dryden, Pope, and Keats, and secondly the special idea of tradition or historicity of outlook as propounded by T. S. Eliot. For purposes of tracing dissociation in sensibility and understanding the true nature of English poetry it is essential that tradition should be analysed in both the forms, and that it should be ascertained to what extent this term "dissociation of sensibility," first used by Eliot to explain the schism or rift in modern artistic consciousness, can reasonably be applied to poetry written today.

Dr. F. R. Leavis, in his *Revaluation,* talking of the main line of English poetry, calls it the line of wit. He further elaborates this "line of wit" when he says that live and strong poetry should be in close touch with the living popular culture of the time, and should satisfy the exacting demand of "classical" standards. It should be condensed and witty, and use the rhythms of spoken language and imagery reflecting composite experience. Along with grace, poise, and balance coming from the study of exacting classics, it should have the strength to assimilate all experience. Among Dr. Leavis's requisites two are: an essentially native English character of language, and a "tough reasonableness behind lyric grace."[1] Talking of wit in Abraham Cowley, he says that Cowley possessed sound common sense.[2] Dryden, according to him, evinced in his works the native English

[1] F. R. LEAVIS: *Revaluation* (1936), p. 24 [2] *Ibid.*, p. 30

strength, based on reality, whereas in Ben Jonson one could discern a firmness and robustness belonging to the ideal.[3] Leavis's definition, or for that matter that of any single critic or artist, of the main line of English poetry cannot be taken as truly representative. In fact, in every age the biggest challenge before poets or poetry has been the challenge to absorb the existing mass of ideas, of intellectual, social, and moral reality, and to express them in poetic form. On its way English poetry, right from the earliest times, has had to deal with peculiar situations and has used conceits — paradoxes, too — to fulfil the demand of the age. Western thought has been a curious mixture of the analytical and the deeply, passionately emotional; hence English poetry has continually been devising means to cope with the situation, sometimes elaborating, sometimes condensing; in modern times allusions, the removal of connecting narrative links, frequent subtle, sharp, and sudden transitions of meaning, and the juxtaposing of totally different, disparate things are some of the devices improvised to effect a harmonized, unified expression.

Eliot, in his essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent,"[4] gave his own individual interpretation of history and tradition. He asked the artist to have that peculiar sense and constant awareness of the past which must envelop and enlarge his sensibility. It is a historical sense that involves perception,

> not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity."[5]

This goes on continuously refining his sensibility, and obliges him to keep himself in the main current of life, letters, and ideas.[6] And within the framework of this traditional sense the poet must realize his own impersonality, his role as a catalytic agent, nothing more, nothing less.[7]

Three things emerge from analysis of tradition by Eliot. First, besides conditioning and refining of the artist's sensibility, Eliot expects that a constant awareness of the past would combine and unify the present sensibility of the poet with that of the past. Second, the artist, by keeping

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 31

[4] T. S. ELIOT: *Selected Prose* (Penguin Books, 1958), p. 21

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 23 [6] *Ibid.*, p. 24

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 26

himself at the hub of things in his own day, must keep aware of, and grapple with, the most agitating and crucial issues of his time. This alone will supply a hard core to his poetry, or provide a "tough reasonableness" to his poetized experience, in Dr. Leavis's phrase. Third, it is not the novelty of emotions, or novel emotions, that a poet expresses through his works; in his own words:

> One error, in fact, of eccentricity in poetry is to seek for new human emotions to express; and in this search for novelty in the wrong place it discovers the perverse. The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to use the ordinary ones and, in working them up in poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual emotions at all.[8]

Eliot does not speak of the dissociation of sensibility in "Tradition and the Individual Talent." That was to come later. But here is a strong plea for unified, integrated sensibility and a new thought for modern aesthetics.

Eliot used the term "dissociation of sensibility" in an essay on the Metaphysical poets which he wrote in 1921. He borrowed this term from Gourmont, who used it in connection with Jules Laforgue and the analysis of the processes of poetry in the mind of the individual. Talking of the unified sensibility of the metaphysical poets and the schism in the modern artist Eliot observed:

> The difference is not a simple difference of degree between poets. It is something which had happened to the mind of England between the time of Donne or Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the time of Tennyson and Browning; it is the difference between the intellectual poet and the reflective poet. Tennyson and Browning are poets and they think; but they do not feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose. A thought to Donne was an experience, it modified his sensibility. When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular and fragmentary. The latter falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes.
>
> We may express the difference by the following theory: The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors of the dramatists of the sixteenth, possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could devour any kind of experience. They are simple, artificial, difficult, or fantastic, as their predecessors were: no less nor more than Dante, Guido Cavalcanti, Guinicelli, or Cino. In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered; and this dissociation, as is natural, was aggravated by the influence of the most powerful poets of the century, Milton and Dryden.[9]

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 29 [9] *Ibid.*, p. 117

Eliot's last utterance on this subject is in his Henriette Hertz Lecture on Milton, delivered for the British Academy on 26 March 1947. The relevant portion reads:

> I believe that the general affirmation represented by the phrase "dissociation of sensibility" ... retains some validity; but ... to lay the burden on the shoulders of Milton and Dryden was a mistake. If such a dissociation did take place, I suspect that the causes are too complex and profound to justify our accounting for the change in terms of literary criticism. All we can say is, that something like this did happen; that it had something to do with the Civil War; that it would be unwise to say it was caused by the Civil War, but that it is a consequence of the same cause which brought about the Civil War; that we must seek the causes in Europe, not in England alone; and for what these causes were, we may dig and dig until we get to a depth at which words and concepts fail us![10]

B. B. PALIWAL

(To be concluded)

WE ARE aware of evanescent visitations of thought and feeling, sometimes associated with place or persons, sometimes regarding our own mind alone, and always arising unforeseen and departing unbidden, but elevating and delightful beyond all expression ... It is as it were the interpenetration of a diviner nature through our own; but its footsteps are like those of a wind over the sea, which the coming calm erases ... These and corresponding conditions of being are experienced principally by those of the most delicate sensibility and the most enlarged imagination; and the state of mind produced by them is at war with every base desire. The enthusiasm of virtue, love, patriotism, and friendship, is essentially linked with such emotions; and whilst they last, self appears as what it is, an atom to a universe.

—SHELLEY

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 139

R. M. FOX

Connolly and the Soul of Man

[Mr. R. M. Fox is well known to our readers by his many contributions. His intimate knowledge of the Irish struggle for independence, and his sympathetic understanding of the leading figures in recent Irish life generally, has often been expressed in his studies of individual Irish men and women.

Earlier this year fell the birth centenary of James Connolly. Mr. Fox has written for the occasion a balanced and understanding account of the ideals of this Irish nationalist and patriot.—ED.]

JAMES CONNOLLY, the greatest figure in the Dublin Easter Rising of 1916, was born in Edinburgh on 5 June 1868, so this is his Centenary Year. He was executed by a firing squad after the Rising although, owing to a leg injury, he had to be propped up on a chair. During that fateful week he was the Commandant-General of the Republican forces in Dublin.

His fame does not rest solely upon his leadership of the Easter Rising but on his work as historian, organizer, and agitator in the Labour cause. His principal contribution was *Labour in Irish History,* in which he examined the role of the Irish working class in earlier national struggles and concluded that the weakness of these movements had always been due to the compromise or betrayal on the part of the Irish propertied elements, who found they had more in common with the Imperialist rulers than with the Irish working people.

In general his approach to this question was in line with Marxian theory although he very carefully documented the facts of the various insurrections. As a young man in Edinburgh he had taken a keen interest in Socialist agitation. This led to his victimization in the Scottish city; so he came to Dublin, where he founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party, which, in 1896, issued a journal, *The Workers' Republic,* under his editorship.

His economic position was so insecure that he had to leave Ireland for America in 1903 and did not return till 1910. The following year he became the secretary and organizer of the Irish Transport Workers' Union in the Belfast area. This militant union had been founded by Jim Larkin in Dublin not long before. Connolly then was a Republican and a Socialist. In his work as a trade-union organizer he was not so much concerned with theoretical disputation as with the day-to-day activities which centred upon wages and working conditions. On the Labour side he emphasized solidarity, while on the national front, although he bitterly condemned those whom he regarded as hostile to the Rising, he was increas-

ingly ready to make common cause with all who would fight for national independence whether they agreed with his social views or not.

Three years before the 1916 struggle there was the great Labour clash in Dublin in which a third of the city population was involved. The strike — or lock-out as it was sometimes described — dragged on for eight months, bringing starvation and misery with it, but also greater militancy. At this period the Irish Citizen Army was organized as a strikers' defence force. It was this army that Connolly later used as the spearhead of the Easter Rising when the Irish Volunteers were divided on the issue of fighting. And it was the suffering of the poor in the Dublin tenements that gave an added bitterness to Connolly's outlook. Connolly himself was imprisoned at this time and forced his way out of gaol by hunger-striking.

The question which perturbed many Socialists in Britain and elsewhere was whether Connolly was justified in joining in a purely national rising. On this issue Lenin whole-heartedly approved of Connolly's action and wrote in defence of his stand when other Socialists criticized it. What, however, should be made clear is that Connolly was never a narrow, rigid dogmatist. He was too anxious to get things moving, to get things done. Unlike some of the Marxist theorists he refused to take an anti-religious line. In *Labour, Nationality and Religion* he wrote that "Socialism is neither Protestant nor Catholic, Christian nor Freethinker, Mohammedan nor Jew; it is only human."

In this we get the key to Connolly's character and outlook. He was intensely human and believed in the power of the human spirit. There have been many men with a great knowledge of Socialist theory, but this has not prevented some of them from taking an opportunistic attitude when a more resolute stand would have meant personal sacrifice. Men like Connolly, who have made a mark on the life of their times, are moved by the human spirit, an overwhelming feeling of sympathy and solidarity with the oppressed. This is far more important than any theory, for it is the humanity of such men which calls up support and makes their achievement possible.

Connolly cannot be measured by any petty yardstick of dogma, either nationalist or Labour. The little men of the Marxian textbooks, mumbling their favourite incantations, have not known what to make of Connolly. He irritated them by his unorthodoxy. One even described him as "an agent of the Jesuits"! Yet he had read widely and thought deeply on social matters. He knew that theory can only be an approximation to reality, for man is greater than any theory and the more rigid this becomes the more it fails to make allowance for life. He refused to accept any explanation of the world that treated men and women as ciphers, as undifferentiated masses whose individual strivings and sufferings were of

no account. With his sense of the value of life he was constantly endeavouring to raise this to a higher level of conduct, of comfort, and of culture. So he stressed social and economic aims.

He was a man of great individuality, combining the acceptance of the Marxian view of economics and of history — as a record of social struggles — with the Christian outlook which emphasized the value of the human soul. Connolly was not by any means the first man to realize the revolutionary implications of Christianity. If a man is simply a bubble of gas, a product of chemical action, he may be used as a machine handle or as cannon fodder without any question of the degradation of humanity. But once admit his possession of a soul and the case against human degradation becomes infinitely stronger.

R. M. FOX

YEN YUAN asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him."

Chung-kung asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "It is, when you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family."

Tsze-chang asked what constituted intelligence. The Master said, "He with whom neither slander that gradually soaks into the mind, nor statements that startle like a wound in the flesh, are successful, may be called intelligent indeed."

—from the *Analects* of CONFUCIUS

New Books and Old

Masti's Short Stories*

WE have not yet defined the short story. Its length is still a matter of individual decision, its subject-matter is unconfined by any limitation, and its style can vary from the crystalline clarity of the ancient *upākhyāna* to the vagaries of the stream-of-consciousness. Indeed, a short story these days need not recount a story at all. Some modern critics even observe that a short story is meant to read like a lyric and suggest a mood — no more. However, the general public has wisely retained its fondness for the conservative method of story-telling. A short story should give us a story or an episode. Incidentally it should try some subjective self-analysis or probe delicately a particular mood. Only those authors who follow this "conventional" method have survived the ravages of Time.

In India Masti has retained his popularity over a few decades though he has not been devalued in the process. The stamp of his genius is on all his stories. He can analyse the present situation with punch and wit, evoke the heroic memory of the land with pride and poetry, and unseal the springs of a prayerful mood in us by exploiting our religious past. This fifth collection of his short stories in English presents a pleasing variety of themes. Here we see a venerable sage, often with a mischievous glint in his eye, telling stories with effortless ease. There is an austerity about his choice of characters and incidents, and often the tale is built around an undramatic episode. By inducing a calm happiness in us, Masti brings to our mind's eye the glory and the good in man's existing on this planet.

This volume opens with "Chandravadana," the tale of a girl attached to a dramatic troupe. The undercurrent of tension is not glaringly obvious to the reader because the style is full of banter, and Masti would have us accept this "life" too. The story is quite a tame affair. Chandravadana, the leading lady of Surappa's drama company, becomes pregnant. Surappa, who is her uncle, wants the child destroyed, as its birth would mean Chandravadana's absence from the stage, involving the loss of forty thousand rupees. Chandra, with the help of the narrator's uncle, runs away, gives birth to a son, and returns to the squalor of her existence in the company. She begins to act as Shankuntala with her own son in the role of Bharata, and all is well. But the story leaves a deep impression upon our minds when we realize that Chandra is the symbol of thousands of young girls cursed to live in a particular set-up. The tragedy of Chandra — which is yet no tragedy as Chandra herself accepts her lot quite cheerfully — is touched upon only once and is almost lost in the rest of the story. The story progresses by means of the conversations between would-be Romeos and Lotharios. It is very well for these young college students to talk flippantly, for all their future lies before them, full of promise. But, for that Shankuntala-Mandaravalli-Leelavathi of an evening's illusion, what is the future to be when the brief period of youth and beauty is over? The narrator, an adolescent college youth, hears her singing at a party:

> In it she said: "I may be a *sarpini stree* but there is liberation from the toil of life even for me, is there not?" I have now forgotten the first words of the song. The tune was so beautiful that no-one attended to the words.

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* *Short Stories*. By MASTI VENKATESA IYENGAR. (Jeevana Karyalaya, Bangalore. 136 pp. 1968. Rs. 3.00)

But when I heard these few words of the song I was greatly moved. This is one disgraceful fact about our life. Here was a good girl: a handsome girl who could have been in a household and lived like anyone else. Why should she be required to lead this kind of life, and taught to call herself a "*sarpini*" and ask hearers whether she was not entitled to liberation like them?

"The Naval Captain" also touches a brief moment of pathos. A Captain returns home after a long absence to find his wife in the maternity hospital. The child conceived in sin is still-born but the sin itself remains. In a few deft strokes Masti musters the will-power of the captain. Till almost the end we have no idea of this sacrifice, for it is all talk about the Japs bombing and the heroism of youngsters. Just when we feel that the young trainees under the Captain were the greatest heroes, as they faced death bodly, we are made aware of a greater heroism in the Captain himself.

"For Crows Only" is almost Valmikian. A singing bird and its mate build a nest in the author's house. The bird's little nestling is killed by a host of crows even as the tits look upon the macabre scene, "their hearts desolate, their eyes fixed in despair." If Valmiki's rage took the form of an exquisite couplet, Masti Venkatesa Iyengar's anger jerks out in sharp barb-like sentences and hits the heart of jealous and envious mankind.

"Possessive Case" is another example of Masti's gentle humour. A widow refuses to marry a widower because she thinks that her dead husband has been born again as a dog and is guarding her. This illusion is due to the peculiar resemblance between the dead Chamu's eyes and the eyes of the dog Bhyru. Every sentence in this story ripples with humour:

Chamu had always been a good eater but gastric trouble seemed to sharpen his taste for good viands. With a recklessness that seemed to me criminal he ate hot and sweet stuff in the hotels, when the household under doctor's orders put him on diet, and seemed literally to choose the cremation ground as the best place of all in the world to lie in.

Masti's historical romance *Chenna Basava Nayaka* is well known. "The Hoysala Commander" and "Savi" in this volume are imaginative reconstructions of historical fragments. "Ranganatha of White Hill" fancies the deity Biligiri Ranga as descending to earth to please an elderly devotee. Step by step Masti uncovers the identity of the Soliga youth as he escorts the devotee's son. The atmosphere is vibrant with an unspoken ecstasy. By a sleight of hand Masti transforms the scene in which the Soliga youth is ascending his elephant into a miraculous vision. Yet there is no hankering after cheap miracles. Only the aged lady, in the fullness of her devotion, envisions Biligiri Ranga on the ceremonial elephant. As for the son, here is only a Soliga youth on a tamed elephant bathed in the lightning from the skies. But he and we, the readers, become aware of a deep stirring of the soul. Miracles still happen — but do they? But then, why not?

"Gouthami Tells a Story" and "The Birth of an Upanishad" are fanciful accounts of known characters. However, Masti's pen is never wielded in vain. From the former story we learn the virtues of self-discipline and from the latter the greatness of *karma yoga*. "Man's Upanishat is in words; God's Upanishat is in creation."

In these stories there is relaxation for the mind, enthusiasm for the hopeful, romance for the jaded, and heroism for the common man. Finally, one feels grateful to the author for being so kind and so wise. These are not merely stories; they are brief experiences in themselves.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

H. P. BLAVATSKY: *Collected Writings*. (Vol. I: 1874–8. 570 pp. 1966; Vol. II: 1879–80. 590 pp. 1968. The Theosophical Publishing House, Wheaton, Ill., U.S.A.)

With the publication of *Isis Unveiled* in 1877 and *The Secret Doctrine* in 1888, H. P. Blavatsky opened up, so to say, a pathway, long hidden, to a vast store of knowledge and wisdom concerning many a bewildering and controversial subject in science and religion. To an earnest student of philosophy and occultism her literary works may be said to be of immense help as they unravel the apparently meaningless and mysterious statements found scattered in all books of religions and cults.

These recently published collected writings, covering a number of years from 1874 onwards, bring to light little-known facts about her own life and the great inspiration at work in her tremendously busy life in three continents — Asia, Europe, and, America. Her diaries reveal a continuity of purpose under a veil of trivialities.

While Vol. I deals with phenomena and spiritualism, her "Occult shot," as she says, finds a mark with the awakening of thought in a vast number of seeking minds of that time. It shows the gradual progress of the Theosophical Movement from resolve, study, and practice, to action.

Vol. II reveals further the identity and unity of ideas underlying all religions of the world. Step by step she tears down the erroneous and the irrelevant, from the true and basic — the Vedas, the Kabala, the Bible, and other works are shown in their esoteric meaning. The inner meaning of the cross, fire worship, Grecian rites, all come under her gaze. It also shows the growth towards the formation of the Theosophical Society.

The importance of these publications cannot be overestimated. One might stumble suddenly upon what one has been seeking, or suddenly something becomes clear from a thick cloud of allegories and superstitions. To a student certainly these are of great help.

ANASUYA R. SHENOY

Journeys in Belief. By RICHARD ACLAND, ARTHUR CALDER-MARSHALL, ABRAHAM ISAAC CARMEL, PETER DE LA CHEROIS CROMMELIN, BERNARD DIXON, MONICA FURLONG, MARTYN GREET, HECTOR HAWTON, CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS, CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD, DOUGLAS HYDE, ROM LANDAU, HYMAN LEVY, HUGH MONTEFIORE, EARNEST SHIPPAM, ALAN STUART, PHILIP TOYNBEE, JOHN F. A. WILLIAMS. Edited by BERNARD DIXON. (Unwin Forum 2. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 239 pp. 1968. 28*s*.)

This is the kind of book which it is a pain and a pleasure to read but a real torment to review. In it eighteen persons, of some importance, describe how they changed their basic convictions. It is not pleasant to read how, in some cases, one's own dearest beliefs have been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Yet it is a matter for rejoicing that in so many cases they have found what they sought and which brings satisfaction. But, eighteen ... how can one short review even begin to sample?

To some extent the value of the book is lessened in that all the writers come from one cultural tradition, that of the Anglo-Saxon world, but this is more than compensated for by the remarkable spread of the whence and the whither. As might be expected there is a large element of movement from traditional Christianity to some form of Humanism, and in one case from extreme, missionary, evangelicalism. More remarkable is the change from orthodox Christianity to Judaism and vice versa. There is evidence also of two-way traffic as between Christianity and Communism. There are two cases of Christian conversion to Islam and Vedantism respectively. It is likely that Christopher Isherwood's account of what Vedanta

means to him will excite most interest among readers of this journal. It is of some significance that his studies here have opened to him the reality of certain truths of Christianity which had escaped him in days of mere acquiescence.

As may be expected the form of the religion from which most of the cases cited move away is hardly the best, or even the normative. In the days of half belief in casual creeds there is much of the formal and traditional and not a little of what can only be called parody. Yet in some cases we have evidence of long agonized seeking and of genuine development of perception. Indeed from many points of view the most satisfactory accounts come from those who have not come to some final resting point but who are still pilgrims. Is it only by accident that only one of the sixteen is a woman? Or is there something significant here? However that may be, followers of all faiths, or none, will read this book and ponder its many messages to their profit; for, as the "blurb" rightly indicates, the book illustrates the foundations of belief and scepticism.

MARCUS WARD

Studies in Islamic Mysticism. By R. A. NICHOLSON. (Cambridge University Press, Library Editions. Cambridge University Press, London. xiv+282 pp. Reprinted 1967. 55*s*.)

A warm welcome is to be extended to this reprint of the late Professor Nicholson's book, which has been unobtainable for nearly thirty years. Published originally as the companion volume to his *Studies in Islamic Poetry,* it provides in the form of three extended and separate essays a deeper insight into the origins and nature of Sufism than many more comprehensive but at the same time more superficial surveys of the subject.

The three essays are woven round the personalities and teachings of three great Sufi figures, each with his own distinctive contribution. The first, the eleventh-century Persian Abū Sa'īd ibn Abī'l-Khayr, is probably best known as the reputed author of a famous collection of mystical *rubā'īyāt;* but, as Nicholson points out, these more probably form "a miscellaneous anthology drawn from a great number of poets who flourished at different periods, and consequently they reflect the typical ideas of Persian mysticism as a whole." Nicholson prefers to base his account of the great mystic on the sayings and sermons quoted in two biographical works written a century or so after his death. From them we gain a vivid picture of the saint as a great teacher and preacher of Sufism, rather than as an originator of doctrine.

The second chapter is the most substantial of Professor Nicholson's essays, taking as its theme the Sufi doctrine of the "Perfect Man" (*al-insānu'l-kāmil*) as developed in the treatise of the fourteenth-century mystic Abdu'l-Karīm ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jīlī, a descendant of the founder of the Qādirī order of dervishes. Nicholson's analysis of this difficult text is masterly, offering in a short compass of sixty-five pages a definitive statement of this fundamental Sufi doctrine, which seems first to have been enunciated in specific form by Ibnu'l-Arabī in the early thirteenth century, though the idea is of course as old as Sufism itself. Nicholson himself offers as a general definition of the term "a man who has fully realized his essential oneness with the Divine Being in whose likeness he is made," and as such the Perfect Man, who is typified not only by the prophets but also by the hierarchy of Sufi *awliyā* or saints, fulfils the function of a mediator between the One and the Many.

The final chapter of the book deals with the Cairene contemporary of Ibnu'l-Arabī, Sharafu'd-dīn Umar Ibnu'l-Fáriḍ, in Nicholson's opinion the supreme master of Arabic mystical poetry. As Professor Nicholson points out, the Arab does not possess the "passion for an ultimate principle of unity as has

always distinguished the Persians and Indians." Ibnu'l-Fāriḍ's work therefore offers a sharp contrast in its Semitic colouring to that of Abū Sa'īd and al-Jīlī, and Nicholson's extensive translations from his *dīwān* are therefore of absorbing interest.

No-one would attempt to deny that an understanding of Sufism is essential to the study of Islamic medieval thought. What is not so often recognized is its relevance to developments in contemporary Islam, and to modern philosophical and theological problems in general. No-one who reads, for instance, the Bishop of Woolwich's definition of God as "the ultimate depth of all our being, the creative ground and meaning of all our existence" can fail to be reminded of the Sufi concept of God as "the creative principle and ultimate ground of all that exists."

L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON

The Encounter of Man with Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man. By SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 151 pp. 1968. 30*s*.)

Professor Nasr is himself a striking example of the intermingling of Eastern and Western culture which is characteristic of our time. He has studied at Harvard, and he teaches at Teheran. His subject is philosophy and the history of science, and it is evident from his latest book that he is not only a profound and learned exponent of Islamic teaching, but that he has acquired a thorough grasp of current ideas in Western philosophy and science. It is all the more significant that his book constitutes a vigorous attack on the assumptions commonly made by modern scientists and a plea for the adoption of a widely different approach to Nature. It is his contention that the domination of Nature, which most of us regard as the great achievement of modern science, is actually the essential cause of the troubles which vex us today — overpopulation, the congestion of city life, the destruction of natural beauty, the danger of total war. What we have to do, in his view, is not to dominate Nature, but to understand her, and we can only understand Nature by ceasing to regard her as profane, and recovering the spiritual vision embodied in the tradition of Eastern wisdom.

Professor Nasr's thesis runs counter to many things taken for granted today. He challenges, for example, the whole conception of biological evolution and the whole idea of conquering Nature. He is surely right in seeking to revive the spiritual vision of Nature characteristic of the great seers. But is that vision necessarily opposed to the conquest of natural forces? Nature has its destructive aspects, and from the beginning man has been impelled to seek power over its forces so that his own life may be increasingly secure. In that sense the endeavour to dominate Nature cannot be regarded as a modern aberration, but rather as a necessity rooted in the essential conditions of our life in the physical universe.

SIDNEY SPENCER

The Prodigal Son: Some Comments on the Parable. By R. H. WARD. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. 157 pp. Frontispiece. 1968. 30*s*.)

This is a commentary on a famous story illustrating the supererogatory tenderness of God. It is a book that in its irradiating hope and honesty will perhaps make a special appeal to youth. The author seems to have been himself on a quest, and to be returning with news.

"Real experience is perennially interesting." The message, no doubt owing to this freshness, has an admirable clarity.

Especially illuminating is the testimony concerning eternal life as an inter-

penetration of life diurnal. The faithful are shown to be not only "gazers on the skies." Their belief gives them a present stability. The book has great reach of thought and still a genial mindfulness of things immediate.

But does his sympathy with the engaging younger son make the psychologist author a little arbitrary in his conclusions respecting the elder one? His nature was meant to be the antithesis of his brother's: and neither was to be emulated.

The one was self-restrained but through fear: the other adventurous but greedy and careless (and so potentially cruel).

Ama et fac quod vis. The Buddhist and old-style Christian would interpret this rather differently as "Love is a commanding of Itself."

And the author does subscribe to this view when he roundly defends the religious against the charge that he is but seeking his own salvation.

Mr. Ward is at heart a universalist. But he ends with an earnest admonishment to people to leave the way of greed and fear. And the more conservative would add that the only other path is the Strait or Middle Way of obedience and blitheness.

The nature of the way back for the far lost is conveyed by the book's frontispiece, a representation of *The Prodigal Son* by Rodin.

S. E. BOWEN

William Blake: An Introduction to the Man and His Work. By RAYMOND LISTER. (G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., London. xii+200 pp. 31 Illustrations and Coloured Frontispiece. 1968. 35*s*.)

This is yet another addition to the already extensive literature about Blake, but an addition which, as far as this reviewer is aware, offers little, whether biographical or exegetical, which is not to be found elsewhere in that literature; to which, however, Mr. Lister makes scant acknowledgement in his text, where the only biography he cites is Gilchrist's, the only critical work, Swinburne's. He indicates that connections with Jungian psychology are to be found in Blake's work, but appears not to have read Witcutt; neither does he mention in his bibliography Max Plowman's *An Introduction to the Study of Blake,* by now (it was recently re-issued in a third edition) recognized as the masterpiece of insight that it is.

Meanwhile Mr. Lister gives us what appears to be his own interpretation of Blake's work. It is consistent, but it is scarcely profound, the symbology being far too often understood in a literal sense instead of a psychological one: the suggestion seems to be, for instance, that to arise from death means to be resurrected from the grave. Mr. Lister says that the "Oriental influence" in Blake's work is strong, but he says it only in parenthesis, and with only a passing, and perhaps misleading, reference to Zen Buddhism. We should hardly gather from his book that Blake's symbolism is universal, and that therein lies its truth; but then, Blake's mystical understanding was of a very different order from Mr. Lister's, with the inevitable result that, just as Blake saw that Jesus had walked out of the established Christian churches, Blake tends to walk out of Mr. Lister's pages.

Yet, so long as his modest subtitle is remembered, his book is by no means without value. It gives a clear outline of Blake's life; it pays (as we should expect from its author) proper attention to Blake as a visual artist, and particularly as a craftsman; and it gives some idea of the kind of man he must have been among other and different kinds of men and women. And its attempts at interpreting Blake's prophetic books, sometimes too literal and superficial though they are, will have the effect of opening the eyes of the student (at whom the book is no doubt aimed) to the fact that those books were prophetic indeed, are capable of being

understood, are not the lucubrations of a madman or of any particular kind of sectarianism, and will repay further study under better masters. That, after all, when we remember some of the aforementioned "Blake literature," makes Mr. Lister's book something to be grateful for.

R. H. WARD

The Language of Wisdom and Folly: Background Readings in Semantics. Edited with an Introduction by IRVING J. LEE. (International Society for General Semantics, San Francisco. 361 pp. 1967. $4.00)

The Readings in Semantics selected in this book make significant and illuminating reading. They cover a wide variety of topics, and they are grouped under appropriate headings in nine Parts: The Recognition of Words as Such; The Functions and Purposes of Language in Use; Matters of Fact, Fiction, and Opinion; Questions and Answers; The Ambiguous Word; The Recognition of Differences; Verbal Fascination; The Structural Patterns and Implications of Language; and Escape from Verbalism.

The editor makes the interesting statement that, although the twentieth century

> is being referred to as the Atomic Age ... [it] could with some, though not necessarily equal, relevance be called the Verbal Era, because never before has any people been so incessantly exposed to so much verbal output.

The problem of language is the problem of "adequate statement." But what is "adequate statement"? It is more than finding the "right word." And, as the editor says, "just because a man talks easily, it does not follow that he talks sensibly." A man may be literate and may speak grammatically, coherently, and persuasively, and "still give voice to folly," and so, "the expression of wisdom requires a doctrine and methodology which go beyond the rhetorical." Therefore there is need for the study of Language as an instrument in very much the same way as an artist or technician considers his materials and tools. And there are philosophers nowadays who think that problems of philosophy are essentially problems of language, problems of expression and the *use* of language. The editor's view of Semantics, and the selections made in the Readings, do not appear to go to this extreme.

The Readings selected in this book create, in the mind of the student, an interest in Semantics, and make the subject a fascinating study.

N. A. NIKAM

The Pratīka-Index of the Mahābhārata. Vol. I. Edited by P. L. VAIDYA. (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. 800 pp. 1967.)

In the history of classical Indian scholarship there is no parallel to the successful completion of the grand project of the Critical Edition of the *Mahābhārata* by the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona. It involved about fifty years of constant labour by more than one generation of experts in textual critcism, first under the lead of the late lamented scholar, V. S. Sukthankar (1925–43), then under the late S. K. Belvalkar (1943–61), and finally under the guidance of Dr. P. L. Vaidya since 1961. It is Dr. Vaidya's singular achievement that he released the last of the twenty-two volumes of the Critical Edition in 1966. These volumes extend over 13,000 pages of demy quarto size; and the number of *pratīkas* or verse-quarters is nearly 700,000. It is in the fitness of things that the Index to these should have received the first attention of the learned editor; and we have in the volume under review the first part,

which begins with the *pratīka* "*akaṇṭakānāṁ vṛkṣāṇām*" and ends with "*kṛtāstrān dhārtarāṣṭrāmśca.*"

This Index takes into account not only the verses of the constituted Critical Text, but also the verses and verse-fragments in the Critical Apparatus as well as Appendixes in the Critical Edition. The verse-quarters are first reproduced in Devanagari script in an alphabetical order, and each entry is followed by three numbers, the first in black type indicating the *parvan* (e.g., 1=*Ādi-*; 2=*Sabhā-*; 13=*Anuśāsana-*; etc.); the next in running type indicating the *adhyāya* or chapter; and the last representing the number of the verse in question, further particularized as first, second, third, fourth, fifth, or sixth *pāda* by superior letters: a, b, c, d, e, f. Verse-quarters from the Critical Apparatus are indicated by numbers with asterisks, while Appendix passages are denoted by the abbreviation "App."

The *Pratīka*-Index is beautifully printed on superior paper and is an indispensable work of reference for one and all who would use the Critical Edition of the *Mahābhārata*. We wholeheartedly congratulate Dr. P. L. Vaidya and his team of workers at the Bhandarkar Institute on their laudable endeavour and hope for a release in the near future of the remaining volumes of this valuable and comprehensive Index.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

August-September 1968 has seen three important conferences, that of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, at Dundee, Scotland, the UNESCO inter-governmental conference at Paris to discuss the collective responsibility for the future of this planet, and the eighteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs at Nice, France. Common to all three was the question of scientists' moral responsibility.

The British Association presidential address, by Professor Dame Kathleen Lonsdale, gave warning that science cannot separate itself from social, moral, and ethical considerations without becoming blindly committed to the support of commercial vested interests, or political and military power. This first woman President, a Quaker and pacifist, spoke of the great responsibilities that knowledge and privilege bring with them, which included:

> foreseeing what the "fall-out" from one's research is likely to be over a wide area of human happiness and ... devising "feed-backs" to give warning of potential dagers. (*The Guardian*, 22 August 1968)

As an "informed citizen," the scientist has to exert his influence for right collective choice and action.

The theme of the UNESCO conference was what John Davy (*The Observer*, 8 September 1968) called a fumbling yet determined world attempt at "an awe-inspiring and entirely novel skill — nothing less than planetary management." Anthony Tucker describes it as:

> a basic scientific plea for governments to start thinking of the earth in terms of complex living systems — that is, ecologically — rather than in terms of rapid exploitation.
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> There is an underlying concordance of belief that not only must man learn to manipulate the environment so that it remains harmonious and balanced but that — because man is a

part of a much larger physical and biological system — ill-health produced anywhere in the system is bound to be reflected in man. (*The Guardian,* 10 September 1968)

There was deep concern as to what man is doing to his biosphere with his vast industrial processes and air pollution ("every transatlantic jet burns something like 30 tons of oxygen, producing carbon dioxide"), as also to the soil, the forests, and other vegetation, the rivers and oceans. Pollution is now seen to be no local matter. Swedish forests and lake life are damaged by British factory fumes, Antarctic penguins have absorbed insecticide DDT, and so on. Man himself is affected biologically and psychologically by the technological environment he has himself created, and will destroy himself unless he recognizes this total ecology of life.

The Pugwash conference represents a body of eminent international scientists, East and West, which has an unobtrusive yet strong influence upon governments at a high level. It is concerned with questions of disarmament, arms control, international aggression, the problems of developing nations, and the control of problems produced by technology. A *New Scientist* editorial and an article by Dr. Peter Stubbs (19 September 1968) refer to some of the Pugwash achievements towards disarmament, as also to some of the constructive recommendations which the conference hopes that governments will adopt within a few years, e.g., studying and making more public the effects and dangers of chemical and biological weapons. The editorial asks whether the roots of war do not lie too deep in the soil of human motivation to be kept down by laws, and whether the need in reality is not for greater knowledge of the conundrum — the nature of man. A pertinent question indeed. The ancients were near the truth in calling the earth "a huge animal" (*anima,* living soul). What about consulting their ideas on man also?

The present search for fundamental principles of government and management is a significant trend reported by Rudolf Klein (*The Observer,* 15 September 1968). There has been an increasing confusion between political and managerial functions, so that the central problem of government now is how to cope with all the complicated issues that arise, and how to control adequately the thousand and one decisions to be made. The answer given is that government is taking on functions and responsibilities not really its own. Mr. Klein aligns the report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, that of the Fulton Committee on the Civil Service, and that of the Maud Committee on Management in Local Government. They all advocate a clear distinction between managerial and political operations, "between questions whose answers can be given in terms of figures and those whose answers depend on judgements about what people want or need." If this distinction is made, it is suggested that nationalized industries would be managed as commercial units, but that the Government could demand that they carry out any particular unprofitable project, itself carrying the financial responsibility, if it felt the project essential for public benefit.

We seem to be returning a little to the real philosophical concept of the different functions of the four castes as necessary for any community. The confusion of castes and the later distortions of the concept of caste have blotted out the recognition of its fundamental value. The respective functions and duties of the Teacher (the communication of philosophical and ethical principles of action), the Warrior (political administration or rule), the Merchant (business management), and Worker, are absolutely interlinked, yet all are distinct, and — "the duty of another is full of danger." So it is good that experience itself is teaching the lesson that, unless those responsible to the electorate for government define clearly their area of

responsibility, they may, as Mr. Klein points out, in trying to do two jobs, fail in both.

The whole picture of education in Britain today is fluidic, and not only in administrative factors, nor in the students' revolts. Previously acceptable methods of teaching are being reconsidered more and more. At the university level doubts about the examination system are growing. Stuart Maclure (*The Observer,* 11 August 1968) writes:

> ... the theoretical basis of university examinations ... just won't stand up to the demand for a completely objective assessment of the merits of students which those inside and outside the universities want.

Yet the alternative of continuous assessment, which cuts out the intensified pressure of the final examination, also creates its own problems, and does not negate the subjective element in assessment. The middle way has not yet been found.

Alongside this questioning about examinations is a tendency to replace lectures by seminars and tutorials, as also to break down traditional water-tight compartments as regards subjects. Speaking at a national conference of university chaplains (*The Guardian,* 11 September 1968), Dr. Stephen Prickett of Sussex University saw the new pattern as representing:

> an equal partnership between student and tutor in the joint search for knowledge; removal of the barriers round study subjects, encouraging the merger of the disciplines.

Another reform, humane in character, has also been inaugurated at school level. For some years the question of the rightness or wrongness of corporal punishment has come periodically into the news, accompanied by intense controversy. Now the Society of Teachers Opposed to Physical Punishment (S.T.O.P.P.) has just been founded in London by Miss Jean Adams, a teacher at a London comprehensive school, with the support of several teaching associations. Miss Adams states that the general public is far too little aware of the practice of such physical punishment, and of its psychological effect, especially on deprived children.

Another encouraging sign is the endeavour to change the apparent aims and image of science, which for many people has become "a de-humanizing force ... the enemy of culture; a destroyer of aesthetic values" (John Cross, *The Guardian,* 2 September 1968). Yet science is neither mere technology nor fact-finding. It has its place and fertilizing potentiality in culture also. Mr. Cross instances one endeavour to fuse science and art together, aimed at stimulating children by presenting scientific ideas in dramatic form, showing their beauty and interest — the Molecule Club at the Mermaid Theatre, London. Both science and the arts, he says, will be enriched, if the fundamentals and discoveries of science can be used to inspire our literature, painting, and the rest of our culture generally.